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VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND (1796). Contrarily, Malthus viewed society as 
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America's fundamental law seeks to make real the brotherhood of man.2 
I. PREFACE 
In education, race-based admissions criterion is part of a larger 
governmental initiative colloquially known as “affirmative action.”3 The term 
“affirmative action” derives from an Executive Order of President John F. 
Kennedy instructing the “Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity . . . 
immediately to scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government of 
the United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative steps 
which should be taken . . . to realize more fully the national policy of 
nondiscrimination.”4 Discrimination generally refers to “[t]he effect of a law . . . 
that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality, 
religion, or disability.”5 A plain reading of this definition indicates that 
nondiscrimination is race-neutral and universally applicable. 
Less than twenty years after President Kennedy’s noble nondiscrimination 
proclamation, the Supreme Court of the United States preserved a University of 
California admissions program aimed at increasing the enrollment of certain 
students on the basis of their race.6 The assumed corollary of certain students 
being admitted because of their race is that other students would be denied 
                                                
2 Justice Louis Brandeis, Speech to the Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis (Apr. 25, 
1915). 
3 At this point it should be noted that this Article’s focus is racial affirmative action. Affirmative 
action includes not only programs designed to address racial discrimination, but also gender 
discrimination. For further discussion of gender-based affirmative action programs, see Jason M. 
Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s 
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1998) (addressing the 
differences between race and gender-based affirmative action programs); Rosalie Berger 
Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents 
Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1 (2011) (same). 
4 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 6, 1961) (emphasis added). 
5 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009). 
6 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Although the Court affirmed the 
school’s use of a race-conscious program, it also held that such program must provide an 
individualized review of each applicant’s file. See id. at 317. 
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admission on the basis of their race, i.e., suffer from “reverse discrimination.”7 
And so continues the national debate regarding the constitutional permissibility of 
programs designed to achieve racial diversity in education, and programs whose 
fate will likely be determined by one of two unlikely candidates: another 
Kennedy—Justice Anthony Kennedy—or the Court’s newest member, Justice 
Elena Kagan.8 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action refers to “[a] set of actions designed to eliminate 
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past 
discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future 
discrimination.”9 There have traditionally been three primary focuses of 
affirmative action programs: employment, public contracting, and education, the 
latter of which is the focus of this Article.10 
With the Court’s landmark decision in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,11 affirmative action in the context of higher education burst 
onto the legal scene amidst a time when both the federal and states’ governments 
                                                
7 The earliest reference to the term “reverse discrimination” appears in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, 
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Quarles, the court discussed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and stated that “[t]he history [of the Act] leads the court to conclude that Congress did not 
intend to require reverse discrimination.” Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). The term 
had gained sufficient legal significance by 1974, when John Hart Ely, one of the most widely-cited 
legal scholars in United States history, wrote that “We would not allow a state university to favor 
applicants because they are White . . . whether it [sic] called the adjustment quota, affirmative 
action, or anything else. To allow [AAE programs] to favor applicants because they are Black 
seems to be countenancing the most flagrant of double standards.” John Hart Ely, The 
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 723 (1974). 
8 See infra Part VI (C–D). 
9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (9th ed. 2009). 
10 For further information on affirmative action, see Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up To 
Their First Principles: Reflections on the Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 
(1999) (general discussion of affirmative action); Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: 
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 
(2005) (discussing affirmative action in employment). 
11 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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were initiating broad affirmative action programs. Although various bases for 
such programs have been asserted in the thirty-four years since Bakke, the 
traditional and most common justification is that diversity in higher education is a 
compelling state interest.12 
Part III will examine the historical and legal underpinnings of affirmative 
action in education (“AAE”) programs, as well as the specific legislative and 
executive history, which has ultimately led to the Court’s upcoming consideration 
of AAE in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher V”).13 Part III will also 
explore Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding AAE programs. This survey will 
begin with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,14 generally accepted 
as the first major AAE decision, then unpack two landmark AAE cases against the 
University of Michigan decided on the same day ⎯ Gratz v. Bollinger15 and 
Grutter v. Bollinger.16 Finally, Part III will examine and analyze the Court’s 
voluminous and controversial decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1.17  
Ultimately, the Court concluded from this line of cases that AAE 
programs are not per se constitutionally defective.18 Rather, the Court reasoned 
                                                
12 See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the 
Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (1998) (discussing affirmative action 
policies in secondary education). 
13 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-
345). 
14 438 U.S. 265 (1979). 
15 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
16 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
17 551 U.S. 701 (2007). It should be noted that Parents Involved does not address AAE in the 
context of secondary education, but rather the focus of the case is a primary education AAE 
program. 
18 See, e.g., id. at 720 (holding that for an AAE program to be valid, “the use of individual racial 
classifications . . . [must be] “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government interest); 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307 (same); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 246 (holding that if an AAE program is not 
narrowly tailored, it violates the Equal Protection Clause); Bakke; 438 U.S. at 319–320 (1979) 
(holding that race can be taken into account, but its consideration must be part of a full 
individualized review). 
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that the appropriate standard of review is “strict scrutiny”19 for AAE programs 
based on a “suspect” classification such as race.20 To pass constitutional muster 
under strict scrutiny, AAE programs must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.21  
Part IV will synthesize relevant Supreme Court precedent into a workable 
set of rules with which to analyze the constitutional issues presented by AAE 
programs. Part V will provide an overview of the factual and procedural 
background of Fisher V,22 specifically the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the 
University of Texas’ admissions policies, to the extent that an applicant’s race is 
considered, are violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 The United States 
Supreme Court granted the University of Texas’ petition for a writ of certiorari on 
February 21, 2012,24 and heard oral arguments on October 10, 2012. 
Part VI will evaluate available jurisprudence to estimate the Supreme 
Court’s likely ruling in Fisher V, including an assessment of which Justices will 
vote to reverse Fisher III25 and which will vote to go further and overrule Grutter. 
Next, Part VI will shed special light on the likely votes of the Court’s two newest 
                                                
19 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005) (holding that, if the government 
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, the action is 
reviewed under strict scrutiny); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (holding that all racial classifications 
made by the government are reviewed under strict scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (holding that “all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal 
Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized”). 
20 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that all legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect). 
21 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that “all racial classifications, . . . are constitutional only 
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests). 
22 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher III”), 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 1536 (mem.) (2012). 
23 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher IV”), 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per 
curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
24 132 S.Ct 1536 (mem.) (2012). 
25 For clarity and ease of reference, the individual cases involved in Fisher will be referenced as 
follows: the District Court’s denial of plaintiff’s preliminary injunction (Fisher I); the District 
Court’s ruling (Fisher II); the Fifth Circuit’s ruling (Fisher III); the Fifth Circuit’s denial of 
rehearing en banc (Fisher IV), and; the Supreme Court’s pending adjudication (Fisher V). 
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members, neither of which have yet heard an AAE case as members of the Court, 
and analyze the various ways Justice Kennedy might affect the case’s 
adjudication. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The idea of equality in education is not a 20th century invention, but is 
merely one point in the continuum of our nation’s advancement toward a just and 
fair society. Any thoughtful analysis of the constitutional issues surrounding AAE 
programs must be based upon a thorough understanding of the subject’s history. 
That history shows that the constitutionality of programs which seek to promote 
racial diversity, whether it be diversity in government contracting, public sector 
employment, or education, has been questioned since their inception, regardless 
of how noble their proponents may believe them to be. 
A. Origins: The Roosevelt Era 
In the mid-20th century, the legislative and executive branches of the 
United States government recognized that the federal government’s budgetary 
power could be used as a tool to aid in eliminating racial discrimination. Although 
reasonable minds may disagree on when the genesis of AAE programs occurred, 
it is fair to say that the roots of the federal government’s modern anti-
discrimination policies date at least as far back as President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration, during which the first executive orders prohibiting 
discrimination in federal contract procurement were issued.26 In 1941, President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 whose stated purpose was to “encourage 
full participation in the national defense program by all citizens . . . regardless of 
race, creed, color, or national origin” because the only way the country could be 
defended was with “the help and support of all groups within its borders.”27  
Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered that “[a]ll contracting agencies of the 
Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter 
negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate 
                                                
26 Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941). 
27 Id. 
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against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”28 Notably, 
however, Roosevelt issued the Order because of the compelling governmental 
interest in preparing the nation for war with Germany and Japan, not for the 
altruistic reasons of later affirmative action legislation. The Order merely 
prohibited contemporaneous and future discrimination; it did not have an eye 
towards any past societal, individual, or industry-specific discrimination, all three 
of which became future justifications for race-based legislation. 
B. Expansion: The Johnson Era 
Affirmative action aims to produce a society free of discrimination. 
Perhaps the greatest advancements toward that aim were made during Lyndon 
Johnson’s administration. During his presidency, Johnson constantly pushed for 
enhanced civil rights protections. The Johnson administration’s most significant 
accomplishment in the anti-discrimination arena was the promulgation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 Included in the Act’s massive and groundbreaking 
legislation, and of significant importance to AAE programs, was Title VI.30  
Title VI, enacted to prevent discrimination by agencies that receive federal 
funding, states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.” 31 Among the programs receiving funding from the 
federal Department of Education are “[all] state education agencies . . . [and] 
3,200 colleges and universities.”32 
Johnson made another pioneering move when he issued the “Equal 
Employment Opportunity” Order on September 24, 1965.33 Similar to Executive 
Order 8802 that Roosevelt had issued in 1941, the Equal Employment 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq. (West 2010)). 
30 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2010).  
31 Id. 
32 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4.html (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2012). 
33 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
 Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice  [Vol. 1 
 
244 
Opportunity Order reinforced several of the federal government’s already-
established anti-discrimination policies, including a prohibition on discrimination 
in governmental employment, a prohibition on discrimination in employment by 
government contractors and subcontractors, and nondiscrimination provisions in 
federally assisted construction contracts.34 
In the wake of the 1960s civil rights legislation, the late 1970s and early 
1980s became a period during which the nation’s judiciary grappled with the 
constitutional implications of affirmative action programs.35 One of the many 
issues courts struggled with, aside from general treatment of affirmative action 
programs, was how to deal specifically with AAE programs, which had been 
implemented ostensibly to ensure institutional compliance with federal 
nondiscrimination laws. 
C. Interpretation: The Landmark Education Cases 
 One might consider the decisions in a plethora of cases regarding AAE 
programs to be “landmark.”36 By the late 1970s, flaws in affirmative action 
policies began to appear in greater numbers and the term “reverse discrimination” 
had begun to come into common parlance.37 In 1978, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue head on in Bakke, ruling that race may be considered in a 
“holistic review” of an applicant’s file.38 After Bakke, there was relative calm 
regarding AAE programs for twenty-five years. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court 
                                                
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the University of California’s race-conscious 
admissions policy unconstitutional); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that 
Congress could use its power under the Spending Clause to remedy past discrimination). 
36 To provide a concise history on the subject, this Part has narrowed the field to only Supreme 
Court decisions, which have played an extraordinary role in the evolution of AAE policy. There 
are a huge number of lower federal court cases involving AAE programs, and the positions 
adopted are varied. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that admissions programs which discriminate 
in favor of minority applicants by giving substantial racial preferences violate equal protection), 
with Brewer v. West Irondequiot Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
reducing racial isolation and de facto segregation justify AAE programs).  
37 See supra note 7.  
38 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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decided two cases, Gratz v. Bollinger39 and Grutter v. Bollinger,40 which 
reinforced Bakke. Most recently, however, in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court prohibited assigning students to 
public schools solely for the purpose of achieving racial integration and declined 
to recognize racial balancing as a compelling state interest.41 This Part will 
address each of the aforementioned cases in turn, with the hope of building a 
logical framework with which to predict the Court’s forthcoming decision in 
Fisher V.42 
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
 In Bakke, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the University 
of California at Davis’ admissions policy that set forth an implicit racial quota 
was constitutional. Beginning in the early 1970s, “[t]he Medical School of the 
University of California at Davis [(“Davis”)] had two admissions programs for 
the entering class of 100 students—the [‘]regular[ʼ] admissions program and the 
[‘]special[ʼ] admissions program.”43 Out of the one hundred available slots, 
sixteen were reserved for applicants selected via the “special” admissions 
program.44 The 1973 and 1974 application forms allowed applicants to request 
consideration as “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” and as 
members of a “minority group.”45 None, of the many non-minority students who 
requested consideration because of an economic or educational disadvantage were 
accepted under the “special” program, however.46 
                                                
39 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
40 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
41 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–04 (2007). 
42 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-
345). 
43 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 266. 
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 Allan Bakke, a Caucasian male applicant, applied to Davis in both 1973 
and 1974 under the “general” admissions program and was rejected both times.47 
In both years, “special” applicants “with significantly lower scores than 
[Bakke’s]” were accepted.48 After his second rejection, Bakke sought a court 
order compelling his admission to Davis.49 Bakke claimed that:  
[T]he special admissions program operated to exclude him on the 
basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which provides, inter alia, that no person shall 
on the ground of race or color be excluded from participating in 
any program receiving federal financial assistance.50 
 “The trial court found that the [‘]special[ʼ] program operated as a racial 
quota” and violated both the United States Constitution and Title VI; as such it 
declared Davis “could not take race into account when making admissions 
decisions.”51 The court did not, however, compel Bakke’s admission due to 
insufficient evidence “that he would have been admitted but for the [‘]special[ʼ] 
                                                
47 See id. 
48 Id. Although the author finds no correlation, some opponents of Davis’ AAE program have 
pointed to the tale of Patrick Chavis as the epilogue to Bakke. Chavis, who was one of the 
“special” applicants admitted over Bakke, became an obstetrician-gynecologist. In a 1995 article 
promoting AAE programs, the New York Times portrayed Chavis as “an example of the [kind of] 
good [an AAE program] does.” Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 1995, at 36. In the same article, Bakke was described as a doctor who “has no private 
practice and works on an interim basis” and has not “set the world on fire as a doctor.” Id. 
Moreover, in 1997, Chavis himself said, “We need to go back and do a comparison of what 
[students admitted under the “special” program] are doing now compared to [Bakke].” Kenneth 
Lloyd Billingsley, Affirmative Action in Action, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1997, 
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=22235. However, Chavis’ medical 
license was revoked less than a year later due to his “inability to perform even the most basic 
duties required of a physician.” Id. This inability resulted in a patient’s death, one of more than 
ninety counts against him. Douglas Martin, Patrick Chavis, 50, Affirmative Action Figure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/15/us/patrick-chavis-50-
affirmative-action-figure.html. 
49 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. The trial court also found the program violative of the California Constitution. 
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program.”52 On appeal, the California Supreme Court, applied strict scrutiny,53 
and affirmed the trial court’s decision that Davis’ “special” program violated the 
federal Constitution.54 
 In its decision, the United States Supreme Court produced a fractured 5-4 
opinion—including two pluralities55—delivered by Justice Powell.56 The Court 
reversed the California Supreme Court’s decision “insofar as it prohibits 
petitioner from taking race into account as a factor in its future admissions 
decisions.”57 The Court concluded that excluding a candidate from consideration 
solely on the basis of race was unconstitutional, no matter what the purpose.58 
Moreover, because Davis could not prove that even without the “special” 
admissions program Bakke would not have been admitted, Bakke’s admission 
was compelled.59 However, the Court stated that “[e]thnic diversity, . . . is only 
one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining 
the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”60 The Court further stated that 
                                                
52 Id.  
53 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal.3d 34, 49 (Cal. 1976) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). Clearly explaining the standard to be applied, the Supreme Court of 
California stated, 
Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least where the 
classification results in detriment to a person because of his race. In the case of 
such a racial classification, not only must the purpose of the classification serve 
a ‘compelling state interest,’ but it must be demonstrated by rigid scrutiny that 
there are no reasonably ways to achieve the state's goals by means which impose 
a lesser limitation on the rights of the group disadvantaged by the classification. 
Id. 
54 Id. at 38. 
55 One plurality was comprised of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, and the other 
plurality was comprised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist. 
Additionally, Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun all filed separate opinions. 
56 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267-72. 
57 Id. at 267. 
58 Id. at 320. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 314. 
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universities could use race as a “plus factor,”61 citing the Harvard College 
Admissions Program as a constitutionally valid program which took into account 
all of an applicant’s qualities during a “holistic review.”62 
 In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that Davis’ “special” 
program was in fact constitutional and that the California Supreme Court’s 
decision warranted reversal in full.63 Brennan also reasoned that race could be 
used as a factor when it was for the purpose of remedying extensive, prolonged 
underrepresentation of certain minorities in society generally.64 Finally, Justice 
Stevens’ opinion concluded that Davis’ “special” admissions program violated 
Title VI because it excluded from consideration an applicant on the basis of 
race.65 After Bakke, and in accordance with the Court’s position therein, many 
colleges and universities adopted “holistic review” admissions policies that 
included racial minority status as a “plus factor.” 
2. The University of Michigan Cases 
In 2003, the Supreme Court heard two cases concerning AAE programs, 
both originating with the University of Michigan (“Michigan”). In Gratz v. 
Bollinger, the Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that Michigan’s undergraduate AAE 
program was unconstitutional because it did not adequately provide “individual[] 
consideration” of each applicant.66 However, in Grutter v. Bollinger, with a 
narrower 5-4 majority, the Court held that admissions policy of the University of 
Michigan’s Law School (“Michigan Law”) was indeed constitutional because it 
sufficiently allowed for an individual assessment of each applicant’s contributions 
to class diversity.67 Gratz and Grutter are crucial to the analysis of Fisher in Part 
                                                
61 Id. at 317. 
62 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. The term “holistic review” would first be used in Grutter. See 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309. 
63 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325–26. 
64 Id. at 370–71. 
65 Id. at 421. 
66 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003). 
67 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003). 
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VI of this Article because five of the Court’s nine current members contributed to 
those decisions.68  
a. Gratz v. Bollinger 
 Gratz involved two petitioners, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both 
Caucasian residents of Michigan, who applied for admission to the University of 
Michigan for the fall semesters of 1995 and 1997, respectively; Michigan denied 
both petitioners admission.69 In October 1997, the petitioners filed a class action 
suit which consisted of applicants who had “applied for and were not granted 
admission to . . . the University of Michigan for all academic years from 1995 
forward and who are members of those racial or ethnic groups, including 
Caucasian, that defendants treat[ed] less favorably on the basis of race in 
considering their application for admission.”70 The petitioners alleged “violations 
and threatened violations . . . [of] equal protection of the laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . and for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d et seq.”71  
 Although Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policies changed several 
times during the time period relevant to the Gratz litigation, as of 2003 Michigan 
used a 150-point scale to rank applicants, with 100 points needed to guarantee 
admission.72 Under that policy, underrepresented racial minorities automatically 
received twenty points because of their racial status.73 For a comparison, if an 
applicant’s artistic talent “rivaled that of Monet or Picasso, the applicant would 
receive, at most, five points.”74 
                                                
68 The five current members of the Court who took part in Gratz and Grutter are Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia. 
69.Id. 
70 Id. at 252–53 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
71 Id. at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72 Id. at 255. 
73 Id. at 256. 
74 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273. 
 Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice  [Vol. 1 
 
250 
 The Court75 held that because one-fifth of the points necessary to 
guarantee admission under Michigan’s admissions policy were automatically 
awarded solely on the basis of the applicant’s status as an “underrepresented 
minority,” the policy was “not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in 
educational diversity.”76 The Court seemed to articulate the stance that the term 
“diversity” was being too narrowly defined, i.e., that Michigan implicitly 
construed the term to mean only “racial” diversity instead of a broader 
interpretation that encompassed a plethora of “soft variables.”77 
 Gratz produced three separate dissenting opinions.78 Justice Ginsburg, 
joined by Justice Souter, believed that it was constitutionally permissible for 
Michigan to have an admissions policy in which race was considered “to prevent 
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.”79 
An insightful dissent filed by Justice Souter and joined in part by Justice Ginsburg 
observed that the argument that Michigan’s admissions policy operated as a de 
facto set-aside for racial minorities “boils down to the claim that a plus factor of 
20 points makes some observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 points might not. 
But suspicion does not carry petitioners’ burden of persuasion in this 
constitutional challenge . . . .”80 Importantly, Souter foreshadowed the issues 
surrounding “percentage plans”81 that would arise nine years later in Fisher V by 
stating: 
In contrast to [Michigan’s] forthrightness in saying just what plus 
factor it gives for membership in an underrepresented minority, it 
                                                
75 The majority in Gratz was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and also joined Justice 
O’Connor’s separate concurrence. 
76 See id. at 270 (emphasis added). 
77 See infra p. 253 and note 87. 
78 The three dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Stevens 
believed the petitioners lacked standing and that the case should have been dismissed. See Gratz, 
539 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (quoting United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 
876 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
80 Id. at 296. 
81 See discussion infra Part V(A). 
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is worth considering the character of [“percentage plans”] thrown 
up as preferable, because supposedly not based on race. . . . While 
there is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice, it 
nonetheless suffers from a serious disadvantage. It is the 
disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation. The “percentage plans” are 
just as race conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they 
get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they 
are doing or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michigan states its 
purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I would 
be tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its 
frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise in which 
the winners are the ones who hide the ball.82 
b. Grutter v. Bollinger 
 In the companion case to Gratz, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger analyzed 
the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policies.83 The petitioner, 
Barbara Grutter, was a Caucasian female Michigan who applied to Michigan Law 
in 1996 as a Michigan resident. Despite Grutter’s excellent credentials, Michigan 
Law denied her admission.84 Like the petitioners in Gratz, Grutter filed suit 
alleging Michigan Law “discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 
252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”85 
 At the time of the litigation, the goal of Michigan Law’s admissions policy 
was to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's 
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.”86 
Michigan Law’s admissions policy ranked applicants by two different measures 
⎯ “hard variables,” i.e., objective criterion such as GPA and LSAT scores, and 
“soft variables,” i.e., subjective criterion such as “the enthusiasm of 
                                                
82 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297-98. 
83 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
84 Id. at 316. Grutter had a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score. Id. 
85 Id. at 317. 
86 Id. at 315. 
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recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the 
applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection” 
⎯ as well as the applicant’s status as a racial minority.87 Michigan Law asserted 
that its admissions policies required officials “to evaluate each applicant based on 
all the information available in the file, including [soft variables] and an essay 
describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity 
of the Law School.”88  
The Court89 found that Michigan Law “engages in a highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”90 With a 
narrow majority, the Court held that “[t]he Law School's narrowly tailored use of 
race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1981.”91  
The majority’s decision, however, was strongly criticized by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and, perhaps most surprisingly, Justice 
Kennedy, who not only concurred in Rehnquist’s dissent but also penned a 
separate dissent. The Rehnquist dissent argued that Michigan Law failed to meet 
its burden under the principle of strict scrutiny of establishing the necessity of its 
AAE program.92 Accordingly, Rehnquist concluded that “[a]lthough the Court 
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is 
unprecedented in its deference.”93 Furthermore, Rehnquist found Michigan Law’s 
                                                
87 Id. 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 The Grutter majority was comprised of Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer. 
90 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309. 
91 Id. at 307. 
92 See id. at 385–86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 380. 
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program fatally flawed “because it is devoid of any reasonably precise time limit 
on the . . . use of race in admissions.”94 
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part,95 regarded the 
majority’s decision, “which approves of only one racial classification,” as 
“confirm[ing] that further use of race in admissions remains unlawful,” a position 
with which he concurred.96 Interestingly, his dissent responded directly to the 
portion of the majority’s opinion which stated “[t]he Court expects that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.”97 In contrast, Thomas believed that Michigan Law’s 
“current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution 
means the same thing today as it will in [25 years].”98 As further evidence of his 
frustration, Thomas stated “[t]he Court will not even deign to make the Law 
School try other methods, however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to 
violate the Constitution.”99 
During the intervening period between 2003 and the Court’s next major 
foray into the AAE arena, two new Justices joined the Court’s ranks. On July 1, 
2005, Justice O’Connor announced that she would retire “upon the nomination 
and confirmation of [her] successor.”100 Subsequently, on July 19, 2005, President 
Bush nominated John Roberts to fill the vacancy that would be created by 
O’Connor’s retirement.101 However, six weeks later on September 3, 2005, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist died. Shortly thereafter, on September 5, 2005, President Bush 
                                                
94 Id. at 386. The Court had previously emphasized the durational aspect in considering the 
constitutionality of race-conscious programs. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510 
(1980). 
95 In reality, Thomas merely concurred with his interpretation of the majority. 
96 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350–51 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
97 Id. at 310 (majority opinion). 
98 Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
99 Id. at 370. 
100 Letter from Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
George W. Bush, President of the United States (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.c-
span.org/pdf/resignation_070105.pdf. 
101 President George W. Bush, National Address (July 19, 2005). 
 Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice  [Vol. 1 
 
254 
withdrew Roberts’ nomination as O’Connor’s successor and instead nominated 
Roberts to fill the vacancy created by Rehnquist’s death.102 The Senate confirmed 
Roberts’ nomination as Chief Justice on September 29, 2005.103 With Rehnquist’s 
seat now filled, President Bush shifted his attention to filling O’Connor’s seat.104 
On October 31, 2005, President Bush nominated Samuel Alito and Alito received 
Senate confirmation on January 31, 2006.105  
3. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
The uncertainty of these new additions to the Court eventually gave way 
to Parents Involved, a crucial case in developing a framework to analyze the 
Court’s forthcoming decision in Fisher V. Parents Involved is distinguishable 
from Gratz and Grutter in several ways.106 The most obvious distinction is that 
Parents Involved concerned an AAE program in primary education, not at 
institutions of higher education like Gratz and Grutter.107 
In Parents Involved, the Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County, 
Kentucky school districts “voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that 
relied upon students’ races to determine which public schools certain children 
may attend.”108 Both school districts considered the student’s racial 
                                                
102 President George W. Bush, National Address (Sept. 5, 2005). 
103 S. 10771, 109th Cong. § 69 (2005). It is interesting to note that Roberts served as Rehnquist’s 
clerk from 1980–81. 
104 Alito was not President Bush’s first choice. President Bush initially nominated Harriet Miers, 
but Miers withdrew her nomination after facing significant opposition and out of concern 
regarding potentially testifying about her service in the White House. Letter from Harriet Miers, to 
George W. Bush, President of the United States (Oct. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102700680_pf.html. 
105 S. 385, 109th Cong. § 54 (2006). 
106 The decision in Parents Involved is 168 pages long. Although the author could easily write a 
great deal on this case, only the most relevant themes will be addressed. 
107 Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007), with Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 250 
(2003), and Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 311–12 (2003). 
108 See generally Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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classification109 when a student was assigned to a particular school in the interests 
of ensuring that “the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined 
range based on the racial composition of the district as a whole.”110 However, the 
specifics of each district’s AAE programs were distinguishable in certain 
important respects. 
Seattle School District Number 1 (“Seattle”)111 adopted a plan in 1998 that 
allowed incoming high school freshmen to choose from and rank by preference 
any of the district’s high schools with each school ranked in order of that 
student’s preference.112 As some schools were more popular than others, the 
district employed a series of “tiebreakers” to determine which students would be 
admitted into a school that had more requests than available seats.113 The first 
tiebreaker gave preference to students that had a sibling enrolled at the 
oversubscribed school.114  
However, the next tiebreaker—the one around which the controversy 
centers—depended solely on the student’s race in relation to the racial 
composition of the school.115 The racial composition of public high school 
students in Seattle was approximately forty percent “white” and sixty percent 
“nonwhite.”116 If the oversubscribed school’s racial composition was not within 
ten percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite composition, the 
district would identify the school as “integration positive;” once a school received 
                                                
109 Id. at 710. The Seattle school district classified children as white or nonwhite and the Jefferson 
County district classified children as black or “other.” Id. 
110 Id. 
111 The Court took note of the fact that Seattle had never operated segregated public schools, nor 
had it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation. See id. at 712. 
112 Id. at 711. 
113 Id. 
114 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711. 
115 Id. at 712. 
116 Id. Surprisingly, Seattle, with significant populations of Asian (15%), Black (9.9%), Hispanic/ 
Latino (5.3%), and Native American (1%), chose only to distinguish between “white” and 
“nonwhite.” See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, available at 
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/census2000/profiles/place/1605363000.pdf. 
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this designation, only students whose race would “serve to bring the school into 
balance”117 gained admission until the racial composition was within the guideline 
range. 
The issues emanating from the Jefferson County, Kentucky 
(“Louisville”)118 district were in many ways similar to those from Seattle. The 
Louisville district’s twenty-five year court-ordered desegregation plan119 ended in 
2000 after the District Court found that the vestiges of the Louisville district’s 
prior policy of segregation had been eliminated “[t]o the greatest extent 
practicable.”120 Then, in 2001, Louisville adopted a “voluntary” assignment plan, 
whereby most of the district’s public schools were required to maintain a 
minimum of fifteen percent and a maximum of fifty percent black121 student 
enrollment.122 
The Louisville plan assigned a student first entering the district’s schools 
to a school based either on the proximity of that student’s address to the school or 
based on that student’s parental request for a particular school.123 However, if a 
student’s race would contribute to “racial imbalance” as defined under the plan, it 
denied that student’s assignment and/or preference.124 Initial assignment could 
result in an inconvenience ⎯ i.e., if the assigned school was farther away than the 
preferred and/or nearest school. Although subsequent transfer between schools 
was possible, the district would, as with the initial school assignment deny 
transfer requests solely on the basis of the racial guidelines.125, 
                                                
117 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
118 The city of Louisville composed the majority of the Jefferson County, Kentucky district. 
119 See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762–764 (W.D. Ky. 1999). 
120 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
121 See supra note 109. The Louisville district classified students only as black or “other.” 
122 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 717. 
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Upon analyzing the facts, the Court126 recognized two qualifying 
compelling interests of racial classifications in the school context: remedying the 
effects of past intentional discrimination and diversity in higher education.127 The 
Court found that neither district could rely on the interest of remedying the effects 
of past discrimination.128 Seattle had never operated a segregated public education 
system, and Louisville had previously been found to achieve unitary status.129 
The Court further held that both plans failed to demonstrate the diversity 
interest in higher education established in Grutter,130 which the Court interpreted 
as “not focused on race alone but encompass[ing] ‘all factors that may contribute 
to student body diversity.’”131 The Court also noted that, “it is not an interest in 
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in 
effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use 
                                                
126 The majority in Parents Involved was comprised of Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy. However, to the extent the majority held in Section III-B that 
“[h]owever closely related race-based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself 
cannot be the goal, whether labeled ‘racial diversity’ or anything else,” the Court produced only a 
plurality because Justice Kennedy did not join that Section of the opinion. See Parents Involved, 
551 U.S. at 733. Additionally, although Justice Thomas wholly concurred in the majority opinion, 
he also wrote a concurring opinion in which he lambasted Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 748 
(Thomas, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote: 
Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, [Justice Breyer] 
would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race—an 
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board 
of Education. This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half century ago. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
127 See id. at 720–22 (majority opinion). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) 
(recognizing the interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 
(2003) (recognizing the interest in diversity in higher education). 
128 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–21. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 722-25. Although the Court framed its analysis in terms of diversity in higher 
education, the actual analysis focused merely on the interest in a diverse student body; “higher 
education” was mentioned only in passing and did not play a significant role in the Court’s 
analysis. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
131 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (2003)). 
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of race.”132 With this framework in mind, the Court examined the Seattle and 
Louisville plans and held that they failed the Grutter analysis because, under 
those plans, “race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve 
‘exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints;’ race, for 
some students, is determinative standing alone.”133 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, likely to play an important role in the 
Court’s upcoming decision in Fisher V, warrants analysis. First, Justice Kennedy 
agreed with the majority that “[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and 
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”134 
Kennedy concluded that both Seattle and Louisville’s AAE programs failed strict 
scrutiny analysis. Kennedy found that Louisville’s AAE program failed because 
the district failed to “establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual 
student’s race are made,”135 a threshold requirement for proponents of such 
challenged legislation. Although Kennedy never stated that he believed 
Louisville’s plan, as operated, to be unconstitutional, he nevertheless found that 
the proponents failed to sufficiently establish the plan’s details and “[w]hen a 
court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe 
ambiguities in favor of the State.”136 Kennedy also found that Seattle’s AAE 
program failed strict scrutiny, even though the district described in detail the 
“methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions on the basis of 
individual racial classifications,” because the district failed to show “its plan to be 
narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends.”137 
                                                
132 Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25). 
133 Id. at 723 (quoting Grutter, 539, U.S. at 330). 
134 Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 784–85 (“[Louisville] fails to make clear . . . who makes the decisions; what if any 
oversight is employed; the precise circumstances in which an assignment decision will or will not 
be made . . . or how it is determined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a 
given race-based decision.”).  
136 Id. at 786. 
137 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 786–87(Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy took issue with 
the fact that under Seattle’s plan, a school with “fifty percent [Asian] students and fifty percent 
white students but no [Black], Native American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, 
while a school with thirty percent [Asian], twenty-five percent [Black], twenty-five percent 
Latino, and twenty percent white students would not.” Id. at 787. 
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Responding to the Section III-B portion of the Court’s opinion,138 which 
he found “too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all 
people have equal opportunity regardless of their race,” Justice Kennedy stated 
that he believed the Constitution does not “require[] schools districts to ignore the 
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”139 Kennedy found that race-
conscious measures are permissible, but those measures cannot “treat[] each 
student in a different fashion solely on the basis of . . . race.”140  
Kennedy stated that of Justice Breyer’s reliance “on this Court's 
precedents to justify the explicit, sweeping, classwide [sic] racial classifications at 
issue here is a misreading of our authorities that, it appears to me, tends to 
undermine well-accepted principles needed to guard our freedom.”141 In fact, 
Kennedy went so far as to say that the dissent’s analysis was so permissive of the 
challenged legislation that it “bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-
basis review.”142 Kennedy noted that the dissent’s assertion that it was merely 
following stare decisis by relying on the majority opinions of Gratz and Grutter 
was “simply baffling.”143 Kennedy found Gratz inapplicable because it involved a 
system in which race was not the entire classification, and he found Grutter 
unsupportive of the dissent’s position because the system sustained in Grutter, 
unlike the Seattle and Louisville systems, was “flexible enough to take into 
account ‘all pertinent elements of diversity.’”144 
In conclusion, and revealing what will perhaps be the logic behind his 
decision in Fisher V, Kennedy stated that, because of the inherent problems in 
                                                
138 Without Justice Kennedy’s acquiescence, Section III-B is merely a plurality. 
139 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
140 Id. at 789. Kennedy suggested some permissible race-conscious measures, such as “strategic 
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and 
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” 
Id. 
141 Id. at 790–91. 
142 Id. at 791. 
143 Id. at 792. 
144 Id. at 793 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341). 
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defining “race” and who should be a part of a particular classification, the 
Constitution allows “the individual, child or adult, [to] find his own identity, [to] 
define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of 
his race or the color of her skin.”145 When analyzed in conjunction with language 
found earlier in his concurrence, this statement seems to indicate Justice 
Kennedy’s belief that in order for an AAE program to be constitutional, it must 
not allow for decisions to be made on an individual basis. Rather, broad, race-
conscious decisions that are race-neutral on an individual level are a 
constitutionally permissible means to achieving the governmental interest in 
diversity. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS 
 Bakke, Gratz, Grutter, and Parents Involved represent the keystones of the 
Court’s jurisprudential evolution in AAE cases. Before turning attention to Fisher 
V, it is important to recognize the constitutional standards to which an AAE 
program will currently be held. First, the appropriate standard of review for such 
programs is strict scrutiny.146 This “‘standard of review . . . is not dependent on 
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.’”147  
 For an AAE program to survive strict scrutiny, the proponent “must 
demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications . . . is ‘narrowly 
tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”148 In other words, it 
must provide individual consideration of applicants of all races.149 Although a 
determination that a challenged program is narrowly tailored necessitates a fact-
intensive, subjective inquiry, “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of 
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”150 However, an AAE program is per 
                                                
145 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
146 See cases cited supra notes 19–21. 
147 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (2003) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
148 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (1995)). 
149 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
150 Id. at 339; see also, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280, n.6 (1986). 
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se invalid if it “insulat[es] each category of applicants with certain desired 
qualifications from competition with all other applicants.”151  
 The presence of a compelling governmental interest is an objective 
measure, of which the Court has recognized two. The first interest is in 
“remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination;”152 however, it seems 
that this interest has limited applicability.153 The second recognized compelling 
interest is in diversity; whether or not that interest is limited to higher education 
seems unclear after the Court’s decision in Parents Involved.154 This framework 
will be essential to accurately predicting the Court’s upcoming decision in Fisher 
V.155 
V. THE CONTINUUM: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
The Supreme Court remained silent on AAE cases for the five years 
following Parents Involved until February 21, 2012, when the Court granted 
certiorari in Fisher V.156 At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet 
heard oral arguments in Fisher V. Therefore, to provide the ideological support 
for how each side of a likely divided Court will decide the case, both the Fifth 
Circuit’s panel decision157 – which upheld Texas’ admissions policy – and the 
dissenting opinion from Fisher’s petition for rehearing158 – which concluded that 
the program is unconstitutional – will be analyzed. 
                                                
151 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (1978). 
152 Parents Involved, 55 U.S. at 702 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). 
153 The Court in Parents Involved invalidated Seattle’s AAE program in part because that district 
had never operated a segregated public education system. See id. at 702–03. 
154 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (recognizing the diversity interest in higher education), with 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 722–25 (recognizing the diversity interest in higher education, but 
conducing the analysis with only a general interest in diversity). 
155 See infra Part VI. 
156 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (mem.) (2012). 
157 Fisher III, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
158 Fisher IV, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (per curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d 
213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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In Fisher V, as in Gratz, the two petitioners, Abigail Fisher and Rachel 
Michalewicz, are both Caucasian.159 The University of Texas at Austin (“Texas”) 
denied both petitioners’ summer and fall admission into the 2008 freshman class 
at.160 The petitioners originally sought a preliminary injunction requiring Texas to 
re-evaluate their applications for admission without considering their race and 
grant them admission if the re-evaluation produced a different result, but their 
request was ultimately denied.161  
A. Texas’s Admissions Program 
 Texas’s admissions process has two major components. The primary 
component is the “Top Ten Percent Law,”162 which guarantees Texas high school 
students graduating in the top ten percent of their class admission into any state 
university.163 The second facet of Texas’s program—which applies to all 
applicants not admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law—is known as the 
“AI/PAI Plan,” which is itself composed of two scores: an Academic Index 
(“AI”) and a Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”).164  
 The AI is an objective score based on an applicant’s class rank, 
standardized test scores, and high school curriculum.165 The PAI is a subjective 
score that is itself comprised of three separate scores: two applicant essays 
submitted by the applicant,166 and a completely subjective assessment of the 
applicant’s “demonstrated leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, honors 
and awards, work experience, community service, and special … 
                                                
159 Fisher v. Texas (“Fisher I”), 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
160 Id. at 605. 
161 Id. at 605, 610. 
162 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 155 (West). 
163 Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Although characterized as subjective, the essay readers scored within one point of each other 
91% of the time. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher II”), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 
(W.D. Tex. 2009). 
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circumstances.”167 “Special circumstances” refer to “the socioeconomic status of 
the family and the [applicant’s] school, a single-parent home, whether languages 
other than English are spoken at home, family responsibilities, and race.”168 
 Texas’s program organizes the applicants’ calculated AI/PAI scores into a 
selection matrix.169 The program then allocates the applicants according to their 
major preferences, “although in reality there is little availability in most majors 
other than Liberal Arts after application of the Top [Ten] Percent Law.”170 The 
program considers applicants for their first choice of major and then, if not 
admitted, considers them for their second choice of major. If still not admitted, an 
applicant is then designated an undeclared liberal arts major.171 
 The issue in Fisher V arises from the application of the AI/PAI component 
to an applicant pool that has already shaped by the Top Ten Percent Law. The 
Texas legislature enacted the Top Ten Percent Law to promote diversity,172 and 
has proven its success, boasting one of the country’s most racially diverse public 
university systems.173 The question that emerges then, is whether Texas’s 
consideration of the race of applicants who do not benefit from the Top Ten 
Percent Law is a permissible attempt to balance the racial composition of the 
student body with that of the state. 
 
 
 
                                                
167 Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (emphasis added). 
168 Id. (emphasis added). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See infra note 189. 
173 Id. From 1998 to 2007, the number of Hispanic undergraduates rose by 29.3% and the number 
of African-American undergraduates rose by 32.4%. See Lisa Sandberg, Top 10 Rule Limits UT-
Austin, Says School President, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Top-10-rule-limits-UT-Austin-says-school-1791006.php. 
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B. The District Court’s Decision 
 At trial in the Western District Court of Texas,174 the petitioners’ primary 
charge175 against Texas’s program was its failure to advance a compelling state 
interest: 
[Texas’s] diversity goals are ‘open-ended[,]’[] or, in other words, 
because [Texas] has made no effort to define a percentage of its 
student body that must be filled by underrepresented minorities in 
order to achieve critical mass that therefore [Texas’s] use of race is 
not tied to the educational benefits of a diverse student body. 
Rather, . . . it reflects a pursuit of racial balancing that reflects [the 
state of] Texas’ racial demographics.”176 
 The court rejected the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that Grutter 
specifically prohibited Texas from implementing an invalid use of racial 
balancing or quotas by mandating a specific percentage of its student body be 
comprised of racial minorities.177 In summation of the compelling interest 
arguments, the court held that critical mass178 is not a “magic number”: it has 
never been defined as a specific percentage, and is instead defined by the 
educational benefits that diversity provides.179 
                                                
174 Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587. 
175 Among the petitioners’ other arguments were that Texas lacks a compelling interest “because it 
has already achieved or exceeded ‘critical mass’ through its race-neutral policies, most notably the 
Top Ten Percent [L]aw.” Id. at 603. In support of their proposition, the petitioners presented 
several weak arguments in an attempt to establish “critical mass” at twenty percent. See id. at 604–
05. After a thinly veiled implication that the petitioners intentionally presented misleading 
support, the court held that the mere fact that minority enrollment at Texas exceeds twenty percent 
“does not mean [that Texas] lacks a compelling … interest.” Id. at 605. 
176 Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 Id. at 604. 
178 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 432 (4th ed. 2000) “Critical mass” is defined as “an amount 
of level needed for a specific result or action to occur.” In the context used above, the desired 
result was achieving educational benefits as the result of increased diversity. 
179 See id. at 607. 
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 The petitioners also argued that Texas’s program was not narrowly 
tailored180 for several reasons, most convincingly of which, was the lack of a 
“logical end point.”181 However, while the Grutter Court required that “race-
conscious admissions policies must be limited in time,” it also recognized that 
“[i]n the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by . . 
. periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to 
achieve student body diversity.”182 The district court accepted that Texas’s 
inclusion of an evaluation of the program every five years was sufficient to satisfy 
the Grutter standard.183 The district court held, in conclusion, that “as long as 
Grutter remains good law, [Texas’s] current admissions program remains 
constitutional.”184 
C. Constitutional: The Fifth Circuit’s Affirmation 
 The petitioners appealed to the Fifth Circuit in Fisher III.185 The court’s 
panel opinion186 stated very early that “[t]he ever-increasing number of minorities 
gaining admission under this Top Ten Percent Law casts a shadow on the horizon 
to the otherwise-plain legality of the Grutter-like admissions program.”187 
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the constitutionality of Texas’s program.188 
                                                
180 See id. at 609–12. Three of the petitioners’ four arguments were weak and quickly rejected by 
the court. 
181 Id. at 612 (internal citation omitted). 
182 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
183 Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612. 
184 Id. at 613. 
185 Fisher III, 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2011). 
186 It seems the respondents were very lucky regarding the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Judge King, 
one of the three judges on the panel, intimated in a special concurrence that he might have reached 
different conclusions had the court been fully briefed on the Top Ten Percent Law and its effect on 
racial diversity. Id. at 247 (King, J, concurring). Judge Emilio Garza, one of the panel’s other 
members also wrote a special concurrence, which stated “I concur in the majority opinion because, 
despite my belief that Grutter represents a digression in the course of constitutional law, today's 
opinion is a faithful, if unfortunate, application of that misstep.” Id. (Garza, J., concurring).  
187 Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 216–17. 
188 Id. at 217. 
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 The petitioners’ largely repeated their lower court arguments before the 
Fifth Circuit. First, petitioners argued that Texas’s plan goes beyond diversity for 
education’s sake and instead pursues a racial composition that mirrors that of the 
state as a whole, which is unconstitutional “racial balancing.”189 The petitioners 
point to Texas’s reference to “state population data to justify the adoption of race-
conscious admissions measures” as evidence of its true motive of “outright racial 
balancing.”190 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Texas “gave 
appropriate attention to those educational benefits [of diversity] identified in 
Grutter without overstepping any constitutional bounds.”191 
 The petitioners next contended that Texas’s incorporation of race-
conscious programs did not give adequate consideration to “race-neutral” 
alternatives it had already implemented through the Top Ten Percent Law.192 The 
court evaluated that system in context of the Grutter-affirmed goal of diversity, 
noting that “[w]hile the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an 
increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students remain clustered 
in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity”; the 
holistic review endorsed in Grutter better addressed those imbalances.193 
 The petitioners’ last argument was that Texas’s minority enrollment under 
the combined Top Ten Percent Law and race-conscious programs surpassed a 
“critical mass,” and that the additional, minimal “increase in diversity achieved 
through [administration of a] Grutter-like policy does not justify its use of race-
                                                
189 Id. at 234. 
190 Id. at 236. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit struck down the use of a race-conscious admissions policy 
at the University of Texas’ law school. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). In 1997, the Texas 
legislature responded to Hopwood by enacting the Top Ten Percent Law, under which the number 
of minorities enrolled at Texas steadily increased. For example, in 1997, the Black and Hispanic 
enrollment at Texas was 2.7% and 12.6%, respectively. By 2004, Black enrollment rose to 4.5% 
and Hispanic enrollment rose to 16.9%. Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 224. Despite these positive gains 
and by relying on Grutter, Texas adopted a policy to include race as one of the factors it considers 
in admissions beginning in 2005. Id. at 226. 
191 Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 236. 
192 Id. at 234; see also supra note 173. 
193 See Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 240. 
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conscious measures.”194 The court maintained, however, that “critical mass” is a 
determination properly left to Texas’s administrators, and that “Grutter pointedly 
refused to tie the concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed number.”195  
 However, the court seemingly left the door open for the argument to be 
raised again in the future: 
None of this is to say that Grutter left “critical mass” without 
objective meaning. Rather, the legally cognizable interest—
attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students—
“is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce.” If a plaintiff produces evidence that calls 
into question a university's good faith pursuit of those educational 
benefits, its race-conscious admissions policies may be found 
unconstitutional.196 
Moreover, the court added that “[Texas’s] claim that it has not yet achieved 
critical mass is less convincing when viewed against the backdrop of the Top Ten 
Percent Law, which had already driven aggregate minority enrollment up to more 
than one-fifth of the University's incoming freshman class.”197 
 The court also rejected the petitioners’ alternate argument that even if 
Texas had not yet achieved critical mass, “it had come close enough that the 
reintroduction of race-conscious measures was unwarranted.”198 Relying on 
Parents Involved, the petitioners argued that the “minimal effect,” of Texas’s 
race-conscious measures rendered them invalid.199 The Fifth Circuit believed, 
                                                
194 Id. at 234. 
195 See id at 243–44. 
196 Id. at 245 (internal citations omitted). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 246. 
199 Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 246. The district court thought this argument was an attempt “to force 
[Texas] into an impossible catch–22: on the one hand, it is well-established that to be narrowly 
tailored the means ‘must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish’ the compelling 
interest, but on the other hand, according to [petitioners], the ‘narrowly tailored’ plan must have 
more than a minimal effect.” Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 609 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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however, that the Parents Involved Court referred to the challenged policies’ 
“minimal effect” merely “as evidence that other, more narrowly tailored means 
would be effective to serve the school districts’ interests.”200 Perhaps most 
relevant to this Article’s purpose, the court stated that “Justice Kennedy—who 
provided the fifth vote in Parents Involved—wrote separately to clarify that ‘a 
more nuanced, individual evaluation . . . informed by Grutter’ would be 
permissible, even for the small gains sought by the school districts.”201 
D. Unconstitutional: The En Banc Dissent 
After the Fifth Circuit’s panel affirmed the District Court’s judgment, 
Fisher and Michalewicz petitioned for rehearing en banc; with a narrow 9–7 
majority, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition in Fisher IV.202 In an uncommon 
move, five of the seven judges who voted to rehear the case wrote a lengthy 
dissent, which clearly expressed several reasons why they felt the challenged 
program was unconstitutional.203  
The dissent believed that the panel in Fisher III misapplied the strict 
scrutiny standard of review and “supplant[ed] strict scrutiny with total deference 
to [Texas’s] administrators.”204 More importantly ⎯ and indicative of what will 
likely be the crux of Fisher V ⎯ the dissent questioned “whether a race-conscious 
admissions policy adopted [in conjunction with the Top Ten Percent Law] is 
narrowly tailored to achieve [Texas’s] goal of increasing ‘diversity.’”205 The 
dissent concluded that the plan upheld in Grutter was distinguishable from 
Texas’s plan; in Grutter, “the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable 
in more than tripling minority representation at [Michigan Law].”206 Under 
Texas’s plan, however:  
                                                
200 Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 246.  
201 Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
202 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
203 See id. at 303–08 (Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 305. 
205 Id. at 306–07. 
206 Id. at 307 (quoting Parent Involved, 551 U.S. at 704). 
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The additional diversity contribution of the [Texas’s] race-
conscious admissions program is tiny, and far from 
“indispensable.” It is one thing for the panel to accept “diversity” 
and achieving a “critical mass” of preferred minority students as 
acceptable University goals. It is quite another to approve 
gratuitous racial preferences when a race-neutral policy has 
resulted in over one-fifth of University entrants being African–
American or Hispanic.207 
VI. PREDICTING THE OUTCOME 
There are a number of dynamics that will influence the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate decision on the fate of Texas’s AAE program. Will one of the Court’s 
conservative Justices go rogue, citing stare decisis? Will one of the Court’s liberal 
Justices break rank and find that the Equal Protection Clause “creep” has gone too 
far? How will the Court’s newest Justices rule? If the Court reverses Fisher III, 
will it merely find that Texas’s AAE program is unconstitutional, or will it go 
further and reverse Grutter? In what direction will Justice Kennedy’s swing vote 
turn? This Part will evaluate past opinions and political concerns that have the 
potential to influence the future of AAE programs. 
A. The “‘Unconstitutional’ Bloc” 
Based on their holdings in previous AAE cases, four Justices will, in all 
likelihood, vote to reverse Fisher III and find Texas’s AAE program 
unconstitutional: Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Of 
these four, three will also likely opine that Grutter should be reversed altogether. 
The probable conclusions of each will henceforth be addressed in turn, according 
to the likelihood that they will reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision. 
 The Justices most likely to vote to reverse both Fisher III and Grutter are 
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia.208 Justice Thomas has a long 
                                                
207 Id. at 307. 
208 Thomas and Scalia vote together in 92% of cases, the highest ratio among the Court. 
SCOTUSblog Final Stats 0t09-7.7.10, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-JA.pdf. 
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history of ardently opposing AAE programs.209 For example, in Grutter, Justice 
Thomas wrote a separate opinion in which he stated his belief that AAE programs 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.210 Justice Scalia will also likely vote to 
reverse both Fisher III and Grutter. In Grutter, Justice Scalia wrote a separate 
opinion in which he stated, “[Michigan Law’s] mystical “critical mass” 
justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind. 
The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially 
proportionate admissions.”211 Moreover, Justice Scalia believed that the 
“educational benefit” of “cross-racial understanding” is not an “educational 
benefit” at all.212 He reasoned: 
[I]t is a lesson of life rather than law-essentially the same lesson 
taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be “taught” in the 
usual sense) people three feet shorter and 20 years younger than 
the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in 
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school 
kindergartens. If properly considered an “educational benefit” at 
all, it is surely not one that is either uniquely relevant to law school 
or uniquely “teachable” in a formal educational setting.213 
 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, although recent additions to the 
Court, are anticipated to vote to reverse Fisher III, and the Chief Justice will also 
likely find that Grutter should be reversed. Roberts and Alito were both in the 
Parents Involved majority. Roberts’ general disdain for race-based classifications 
manifests itself in his majority opinion for the Parents Involved case which boldly 
states: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
                                                
209 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that “state 
entities may not experiment with race-based means to achieve ends they deem socially desirable”); 
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that “a State's use of racial 
discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause”). 
210 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 346–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
212 Id. at 347-48.  
213 Id. at 347. 
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discriminating on the basis of race.”214 However, it is worth noting that in the 
past, Roberts has at times been willing to vote in a manner inconsistent with what 
might be expected of him in a politically-charged matter.215  Justice Alito, 
although likely to reverse Fisher III, will probably not go as far as to reverse 
Grutter; Alito has previously espoused his respect for the doctrine of stare 
decisis.216 
B. The “Affirmation Alliance” 
There are two Justices that will almost undoubtedly vote to affirm Fisher 
III. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg each have a long history of supporting AAE 
programs.217 Furthermore, each has also supported an AAE program that no 
reasonable mind could find is as narrowly tailored as the one at issue in Fisher 
V.218 
Justice Ginsburg will almost certainly vote to affirm Fisher III. In Gratz, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she gave AAE programs 
wide latitude by stating that “government decision makers may properly 
distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion.”219 Justice Ginsburg went 
on to say “the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being 
                                                
214 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
215 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). Roberts shocked pundits by 
upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
216 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be An Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 318-19 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito). During his confirmation hearings, 
Alito stated in response to a question regarding stare decisis from Chairman Arlen Specter that, 
“in every case in which there is a prior precedent, the first issue is the issue of stare decisis, and 
the presumption is that the Court will follow its prior precedents. There needs to be a special 
justification for overruling a prior precedent.” Id. at 319. 
217 Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
218 See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter, both Breyer and Ginsburg upheld 
Michigan’s admissions policy, which used race as a predominant factor. 
219 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.” 220 Moreover, Justice 
Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved.221 
 Justice Breyer, also, will likely affirm Fisher III. Justice Breyer wrote a 
voluminous dissent in Parents Involved, which asserted that the law has 
“consistently and unequivocally approved of . . . race-conscious measures to 
combat segregated schools. The Equal Protection Clause . . . has always 
distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby 
subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people 
of all races.”222 Justice Breyer also joined the majority and Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence in Grutter.223  
C. The New Justices’ Association 
Since its decision in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court has welcomed 
two new members. On August 6, 2009, Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed to the 
Court to replace Justice Souter, and on August 5, 2010, Elena Kagan was 
confirmed to replace Justice Stevens.224 Although neither has participated in a 
Supreme Court case on point, one can draw insight into their potential 
conclusions from a variety of sources. 
It is exceedingly likely that Justice Sotomayor will affirm Fisher III;225 the 
clearest evidence comes from the fact that Justice Sotomayor has voted with both 
                                                
220 Id. at 302 (citing United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
221 Parents Involved, 551 U.S.at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
222 Id. at 864. 
223 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
224 S. 9063, 111th Cong. § 82 (2009); S. 6991, 111th Cong. § 140 (2010). 
225 Although the author finds little relevance in the following, Justice Sotomayor was heavily 
criticized during her confirmation hearings because of some past comments she made regarding 
race. The most publicized of these comments occurred during a 2001 lecture at Boalt Hall, during 
which Sotomayor said “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her 
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't 
lived that life.” Symposium, Raising the Bar: Latino and Latina Presence in the Judiciary and the 
Struggle for Representation, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (2002). 
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Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in ninety percent of the Court’s decisions.226 The 
most notable affirmative-action-related case in which Justice Sotomayor 
participated prior to joining the Court was Ricci v. DeStafano.227 In this Second 
Circuit panel decision eventually reversed by the Supreme Court, Justice 
Sotomayor voted to allow the City of New Haven to discard the results of a test it 
had given to firefighters because the City believed the test had a disparate impact 
on minority firefighters.228 Justice Sotomayor’s ruling indicates that she finds 
affirmative action programs generally constitutional. 
Justice Kagan recused herself from Fisher V. Although she did not 
announce her motive for doing so, many speculate that it was her tenure as 
Solicitor General during the time the Justice Department filed an amicus brief in 
the Fifth Circuit in support of Texas’s program—the same program that will be 
before the Court in Fisher V.229 Kagan’s recusal is important for two reasons. 
First, because she is the former dean of Harvard Law School, she is likely the 
only member of the Court with practical experience regarding the use of 
affirmative action admissions policies. Second, because one could reasonably 
assume that she would be inclined to uphold Texas’s policy, the prospect of that 
program being upheld is even more tenuous. 
D. The Kennedy Swing 
A scholarly survey of the past twenty years of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence would point to Justice Kennedy as the traditional “swing vote.” 
However, given his nuanced views in the Court’s previous AAE cases, predicting 
Kennedy’s vote is not as difficult as scholars might believe. Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent in Grutter provides a clear roadmap for his likely vote in Fisher V. 
                                                
226 SCOTUSblog Final Stats 0t09-7.7.10, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-JA.pdf. 
227 264 F. App’x 106 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
228 Id. 
229 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-50822), 2010 WL 2624787. As Solicitor 
General, Kagan’s approval was necessary for the brief to be filed. 
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In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that the 
proper rule by which to analyze AAE programs comes from Bakke in which one 
of the Court’s holdings was that promoting racial diversity was a compelling 
governmental interest that can justify an AAE program, so long as it is narrowly 
tailored.230 His deviation from the Grutter majority centered on Michigan Law’s 
failure to narrowly tailor the AAE program, given the attention paid to the “daily 
reports,” which provided constant updates on the number of accepted minority 
applicants.231 
Given the fact-intensive nature of Fisher V, Kennedy will likely find that 
Texas’s holistic review, which includes an applicant’s race,232 is valid. Justice 
Kennedy’s primary concern for constitutionality seems to be giving each 
applicant an individual review, within the institution’s discretion, that takes into 
account all of the many ways the applicant can contribute to the school’s 
diversity.233  
However, Justice Kennedy may find that when used in conjunction with 
the Top Ten Percent Law, the subsequent consideration of race is invalid. There is 
solid factual support that Top Ten Percent Law was increasing the diversity of 
Texas.234 The Top Ten Percent Law increased Texas’s diversity by relying on the 
state’s de facto racial segregation. In other words, if the state’s racial 
demographics were homogenous throughout its territory, the law probably would 
not have made the same advances in Texas’s racial diversity. Based on those 
facts, Justice Kennedy could find that, because of the de facto racial segregation 
                                                
230 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
[A] university admissions program may take account of race . . . [if] the program 
can meet the test of strict scrutiny by the judiciary. This is a unitary formulation. 
If strict scrutiny is abandoned or manipulated . . . , the Court lacks authority to 
approve the use of race . . . [and] undermines both the test and its own 
controlling precedents. 
Id. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
231 Id. at 392 (“The daily consideration of racial breakdown of admitted students is not a feature of 
affirmative-action programs used by other institutions of higher learning.”). 
232 See Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
233 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
234 See supra note 173. 
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in the state and its corresponding effect on high school demographics, the Top 
Ten Percent Law functions perfectly as a race-neutral means by which Texas 
increased enrollment of underrepresented minorities. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 A tabulation of the most plausible outcome of the Justices’ votes in Fisher 
V would produce a 5–3 opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,235 invalidating 
Texas’s program because of the contemporaneous statutory requirements of the 
Top Ten Percent Law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion will, however, reaffirm that the 
AAE program advocated in Grutter—narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest—remains valid. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Alito will join in the portion of Kennedy’s opinion regarding the invalidity of 
Texas’s AAE program and join in a separate opinion holding that race-conscious 
admissions programs are never valid.236  
 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor will almost certainly dissent. 
Whether these three Justices rely on stare decisis or their genuine beliefs, they 
will find that Texas’s program is in conformity with the type of program 
recognized as permissible in Grutter. Therefore, these three Justices will vote to 
affirm Fisher III and will thereby recognize the continuing validity of Grutter. 
The most likely result of Fisher V is that Texas’s program will be found 
invalid, but that the overall validity of AAE programs will be upheld.237 
Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Court’s opinion in Fisher V will have a dramatic 
effect on AAE programs; if a particular program is modeled after the Michigan 
program, then its continued use will be valid. Finally, even if the Court holds that 
any consideration of race in admissions decisions is invalid, a university’s race-
                                                
235 Chief Justice Roberts will likely assign the opinion to Kennedy to avoid losing him during 
circulation of the draft opinions. 
236 That opinion will not receive a majority of votes and will therefore have scant precedential 
value. 
237 The author’s final prediction is as follows: five Justices (Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, Roberts, and 
Scalia) will find Texas’ program invalid; four Justices (Alito, Thomas, Roberts, and Scalia) will 
concur in part and dissent in part, finding AAE programs unconstitutional; three Justices (Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) will dissent, finding both that Texas’ program is valid and that AAE 
programs are constitutional. 
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neutral consideration of socio-economic factors will perpetuate the current status 
quo due to the correlation between race and economics throughout large areas in 
the United States.  
